CITIZEN INTELLIGENCE / EDITORIAL EDITION

Electoral College Model B

Re-Architecture · first-principles evaluation of presidential elections

Reader clarification

Terminology correction: Model A proposes the Maine/Nebraska congressional-district method, not statewide proportional allocation. Model B evaluates competing goals of equal voter weight and state influence. Its six-criterion scorecard represents the author's analytical framework, not an independently validated measurement. Historical explanations and legal implementation paths remain subject to source verification.

Original research pages follow. Interpretative assessments and historical claims should be evaluated against the cited sources.

Electoral College Model B: Re-Architecture

A First-Principles Evaluation of the Presidential Election System

Methodology Note

This is the second of two Electoral College models. Model A (released separately) is the patch: nationwide proportional allocation modeled on Maine and Nebraska, requiring no constitutional amendment. Model B asks a different question: if we were designing a presidential election system from scratch today, what would we build? This model follows a transparent evaluation framework — historical context, stated objectives, a fair scorecard, tradeoffs, and only then a conclusion — rather than starting from a predetermined answer.

Step 0 — Historical Context

Before evaluating the Electoral College, it's worth understanding what problem it was built to solve in 1787. Three real constraints existed then that don't exist today:

• **No fast communication** — no reliable way to quickly count or verify a national vote
• **Distrust of direct democracy** — many framers feared a pure popular vote could be swayed by short-term passion or a demagogue
• **Small-state buy-in** — smaller states would not have ratified the Constitution without a guarantee against being politically overwhelmed by larger states

The question this model asks directly: are those same design constraints still true today?

Step 1 — Define the Design Objective

Every system is optimized for something. Before deciding which voting architecture is “best,” the objective being optimized has to be named first. Two legitimate objectives exist, and reasonable people prioritize them differently:

Objective A: Every citizen's vote carries equal mathematical weight.
Objective B: States, as political entities, retain independent influence over presidential elections.

Step 2 — Evaluate the Electoral College Against the Objectives

Rather than labeling the current system “bad,” this step evaluates what it actually optimizes for, scored fairly across six criteria:

Criterion	Electoral College
Equal vote weight	Weak — small states overweighted relative to population
Majority accuracy	Weak — outcome can diverge from the national popular vote
State representation	Strong — this is what the system was built for
Transparency	Weak — the elector layer is widely misunderstood by voters
Simplicity	Weak — multi-step, indirect process
Public legitimacy	Mixed — strong when outcomes match the popular vote, weak when they don't

Step 3 — Identify the Tradeoffs

These are design consequences, not failures:

• State-based allocation strengthens Objective B (state influence) while weakening Objective A (equal vote weight)
• Winner-take-all rules, where used, magnify the effect of narrow state-level margins
• The elector layer adds an intermediate step with no independent function today, given binding-elector laws upheld by the Supreme Court in *Chiafalo v. Washington* (2020)
• Public legitimacy takes its biggest hit specifically when Objective A and Objective B produce conflicting outcomes

Step 4 — The Conclusion

If the design objective is equal vote weight for every citizen, the architecture that most directly satisfies that objective is a direct national popular vote. This conclusion follows from the framework above rather than being asserted at the outset.

Step 5 — Implementation Paths

The philosophy (equal vote weight, national popular vote decides) is separate from how it gets implemented:

• **Constitutional amendment** — permanently abolishes the Electoral College. Requires 2/3 of both the House and Senate plus 3/4 of state legislatures. No electoral reform has cleared this bar in over

50 years.
• **National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC)** — states individually agree to award all their electoral votes to whoever wins the national popular vote. Works within the existing constitutional structure, no amendment required. Already adopted by a number of states; activates once enough states join to reach 270 electoral votes.

What This Model Is — and Isn't

This model does not claim Objective A is automatically correct or that Objective B has no merit. It presents both as legitimate design priorities, evaluates the current system fairly against six criteria, and only then follows the logic to a conclusion. Model A (the patch) and Model B (this document) are companion pieces — Model A works within the current structure, Model B asks what a system built from scratch today would look like.